if the United States had entered early into World

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if the United States had entered early into World

War IIif the United States had entered early into World War II: What if the
United States had entered early into World War II? If they had joined forces
with Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany would any of the tragic events that occurred
during those years still be written in history? From Pearl Harbor and
concentration camps to communism and the Cold Warits feasible to believe that
some, if not all, of these bumps in the road could have been anticipated
and prevented?
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Category:
History
Paper Title:
if the United States had entered early into World War II
Text:
What if the United States had entered early into World War II? If they had
joined forces with Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany would any of the tragic events
that occurred during those years still be written in history? From Pearl Harbor
and concentration camps to communism and the Cold Warits feasible to believe
that some, if not all, of these bumps in the road could have been
anticipated and prevented? If only President Roosevelt had been more partial to
Hitler than to leaders of the USSR, France, and Britain, maybe history would be
written differently. If Roosevelt had joined forces with Hitler, the United
States could have prevented Hitler from attacking the USSR, and possibly avoided
the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. This could have led to less world
communism and possibly eliminated chances of a Cold War between the States and
the USSR for the forty years after World War II.

Look back to the date of the war’s most massive encounter. It began on the
morning of June 22, 1941, when slightly more than 3 million German troops
invaded the USSR. Although German preparations had been visible for months and
had been talked about openly among the diplomats in Moscow, the Soviet forces
were taken by surprise. Stalin, his confidence in the country’s military
capability shaken by the Finnish war, had refused to allow any counteractivity
for fear of provoking the Germans. Moreover, the Soviet military leadership had
concluded that blitzkrieg, as it had been practiced in Poland and France, would
not be possible on the scale of a Soviet-German war; both sides would
consequently confine themselves for the first several weeks at least to sparring
along the frontier. The Soviet army had 2.9 million troops on the western border
and outnumbered the Germans two to one in tanks and two or three to one in
aircraft. Many of its tanks and aircraft were older types, but some of the tanks
were far better to any the Germans had. Large numbers of the aircraft were
destroyed on the ground in the first day, however, and their tanks, like those
of the French, were scattered among the infantry, where they could not be
effective against the German panzer groups. The infantry was first ordered to
counterattack, which was impossible, and then forbidden to retreat, which
ensured their wholesale destruction or capture.

For the invasion, the Germans had set up three army groups, designated as
North, Center, and South, and aimed toward Leningrad, Moscow, and Kyiv. Hitler
and his generals had agreed that their main strategic problem was to lock the
Soviet army in battle and defeat it before it could escape into the depths of
the country. They disagreed on how that could best be accomplished. Most of the
generals believed that the Soviet regime would sacrifice everything to defend
Moscow, the capital, the hub of the road and railroad networks, and the
country’s main industrial center. To Hitler, the land and resources of the
Ukraine and the oil of the Caucasus were more important, and he wanted to seize
Leningrad as well. The result had been a compromisethe three thrusts, with
the one by Army Group Center toward Moscow the strongestthat temporarily
satisfied Hitler as well as the generals. War games had indicated a victory in
about ten weeks, which was significant because the Russian summer, the ideal
time for fighting in the USSR, was short, and the Balkans operations had caused
a three-week delay at the outset.

The Russians were doing exactly what the German generals had wanted,
sacrificing enormous numbers of troops and weapons to defend Moscow. Hitler,
however, was not satisfied, and over the generals’ protests, he ordered Army
Group Center to divert the bulk of its armor to the north and south to help the
other two-army groups, then stopping the advance toward Moscow. On September 8,
Army Group North cut Leningrad’s land connections and, together with the Finnish
army on the north, brought the city under siege. On September 16, Army Group
South closed a gigantic encirclement east of Kyiv that brought in 665,000
prisoners. Hitler then decided to resume the advance toward Moscow and ordered
the armor be returned to Army Group Center.(Carley 111)
Meanwhile, a drastic undertaking was being launched. The Reich Security Main
Officean agency of the police and the Nazi Party guard, known as the SSdispatched
3,000 men in special units to newly occupied Soviet territories to kill all Jews
on the spot. These mobile detachments, known as Einsatzgruppen, or action
squads, were soon engaged in incessant shootings. The massacres usually took
place in ditches or ravines near cities and towns. Occasionally, soldiers or
local residents witnessed them. Before long, rumors of the killings were heard
in several capitals of the world.

This could be compared to the other killings of Jews in concentration camps
throughout Europe. If FDR had been allied with Hitler, maybe he could have
influenced him to ignore the senseless killing of these innocent Jewish people.

After a standstill of six weeks, Army Group Center resumed action on October
2. Within two weeks, it completed three large encirclements and took 663,000
prisoners. Then the fall rains set in, turning the unpaved Russian roads to mud
and stopping the advance for the better part of a month.

In mid-November, the weather turned cold and the ground froze. Hitler faced
the choice of having the armies dig in where they were or sending them ahead,
possibly to be overtaken by the winter. Wanting to finish the 1941 campaign with
some sort of a victory at Moscow, they chose to move ahead.(Carley 127)
In the second half of November, Bock aimed two armored spearheads at Moscow.

Just after the turn of the month, one of those was less than twenty miles away.

The other, coming from the south, had about forty miles still to go. The panzer
divisions had often covered such distances in less than a day, but the
temperature was falling, snow was drifting on the roads, and neither the men nor
the machines were outfitted for extreme cold. On December 5 the generals
commanding the spearhead armies reported that they were stopped: The tanks and
trucks were freezing up, and the troops were losing their will to fight.(Gerdes
416)
Stalin, who had stayed in Moscow, and his commander at the front, General
Georgy Zhukov, had held back their reserves. Many of them were recent recruits,
but some were hardened veterans from Siberia. All were dressed for winter. On
December 6 they counterattacked, and within a few days, the German spearheads
were rolling back and abandoning large numbers of vehicles and weapons, rendered
useless by the cold.

On Stalin’s orders, the Moscow counterattack was quickly converted into a
counteroffensive on the entire front. The Germans had not built any defense
lines to the rear and could not dig in because the ground was frozen hard as
concrete. Some of the generals recommended retreating to Poland, but on December
18 Hitler ordered the troops to stand fast wherever they were. Thereafter, the
Russians chopped great chunks out of the German front, but enough of it survived
the winter to maintain the siege of Leningrad, continue the threat to Moscow,
and keep the western Ukraine in German hands.(Keegan 208)
The seeming imminence of a Soviet defeat in the summer and fall of 1941 had
created dilemmas for Japan and the U.S. The Japanese thought they then had the
best opportunity to seize the petroleum and other resources of Southeast Asia
and the adjacent islands; on the other hand, they knew they could not win the
war with the U.S. that would probably follow. The U.S. government wanted to stop
Japanese expansion but doubted whether the American people would be willing to
go to war to do so. Moreover, the U.S. did not want to get mixed up in a war
with Japan while it faced the ghastly possibility of being alone in the world
with Germany on top.

In the most immediately critical area of the war, the USSR, the initiative
had passed to the Germans again by summer 1942. The Soviet successes in the
winter had been followed by disasters in the spring. Setbacks south of
Leningrad, near Kharkiv, and in Crimea had cost well more than a half-million
men in prisoners alone. The Germans had not sustained such massive losses, but
the fighting had been expensive for them too, especially since the Soviets had
three times the human resources at their disposal. Moreover, Hitler’s
overconfidence had led him into a colossal error. He had been so sure of victory
in 1941 that he had stopped most kinds of weapons and ammunition production for
the army and shifted the industries to work for the air force and navy, with
which he proposed to finish off the British. He had resumed production for the
army in January 1942, but the flow would not reach the front until late summer.

Soviet weapons output, on the other hand, after having dropped low in November
and December 1941, had increased steadily since the turn of the year, and the
Soviet industrial base also was larger than the German.(Carley 155)
Looking ahead to the summer, Hitler knew he could not again mount an all-out,
three-pronged offensive. Some of the generals talked about waiting a year until
the army could be rebuilt, but Hitler was determined to have the victory in
1942. He had sufficient troops and weapons to bring the southern flank of the
eastern front nearly to full strength, and he believed he could compel the
Soviet command to sacrifice its main forces trying to defend the coalmines of
the Donets Basin and the oil fields of the Caucasus.

The offensive began east of Kharkiv on June 28, and in less than four weeks
the armies had taken the Donets Basin and advanced east to the Don River. The
distances covered were spectacular, but the numbers of enemy killed or captured
were relatively small. Stalin and his generals had made the luckiest mistake of
the war. Believing the Germans were going to aim a second, more powerful, attack
on Moscow, they had held their reserves back and allowed the armies in the south
to retreat.(Keegan 396)
Hitler, emboldened by the ease and speed of the advance, altered his plan in
the last week of July. He had originally proposed to drive due east to
Stalingrad, seize a firm hold on the Volga River there, and only then send a
force south into the Caucasus. On July 23 he ordered two armies to continue the
advance toward Stalingrad and two to strike south across the lower Don and take
the oil fields at Maikop, Groznyy, and Baku.

The Russians appeared to be heading toward disaster, as the German thrust
into the Caucasus covered 185 miles to Maikop by August 9. Hitler’s strategy,
however, presented a problem: Two forces moving away from each other could not
be sustained equally over the badly damaged railroads of the occupied territory.

In the second half of August, he diverted more supplies to the attack toward
Stalingrad, and the march into the Caucasus slowed. Nevertheless, success seemed
to be in sight when the Sixth Army and Fourth Panzer Army closed near the
Stalingrad suburbs on September 3.(Gerdes 254)
The USSR reached its low point in the war at the end of July 1942. The
retreat was almost out of hand, and the Germans were getting into position to
strike north along the Volga behind Moscow as well as into the Caucasus. On July
28 Stalin issued his most famous order of the war, Not a step back! While
threatening Draconian punishments for slackers and defeatists, he relegated
communism to the background and called on the troops to fight a patriotic
war for Russia. Like Hitler, he had thus far conducted the war as he saw fit. In
late August he called on his two best military professionals, Zhukov, who had
organized the Moscow counteroffensive in December 1941, and the army chief of
the General Staff, General Aleksandr M. Vasilyevsky, to deal with the situation
at Stalingrad. They proposed to wear the enemy down by locking its troops in a
bloody fight for the city while they assembled the means for a
counterattack.(Keegan 312)
The Axis was riding a high tide in midsummer 1942. Stalingrad and the
Caucasus oil were seemingly within Hitler’s grasp, and Rommel was within
striking distance of the Suez Canal. The Japanese had occupied Guadalcanal at
the southern end of the Solomons chain and were marching on Port Moresby. Within
the next six months, however, the Axis had been stopped and turned back in the
Soviet Union, North Africa, and the southwest Pacific.

U.S. Marines landed on Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942. Against a small
Japanese garrison, the landing was easy. Afterward nothing was easy. The
Japanese responded swiftly and violently by sea and by air. The outcome hinged
on the Japanese navy’s ability to bring in reinforcements, which was
substantial, and the U.S. Navy’s ability to keep the marines supplied, which was
at times in some doubt. While the marines battled a determined foe in a
debilitating tropical climate, between August 24 and November 30 the navy fought
six major engagements in the waters surrounding the island. The losses in ships
and aircraft were heavy on both sides, but the Japanese were more seriously hurt
because they could not afford to accept a war of attrition with the Americans.

Their warships did not come out again after the end of November, and the
Americans declared the island secure on February 9, 1943. (Gerdes 230)
On the eastern front the Germans’ advances to Stalingrad and into the
Caucasus had added about 680 miles to their line. No German troops were
available to hold that extra distance, so Hitler had to use troops contributed
by his allies. Consequently, while Sixth and Fourth Panzer armies were tied down
at Stalingrad in September and October 1942, they were flanked on the left and
right by Romanian armies. An Italian and a Hungarian army were deployed farther
upstream on the Don River. Trial maneuvers had exposed serious weaknesses in
some of the Axis’s armies.

On the morning of November 19, in snow and fog, Soviet armored spearheads hit
the Romanians west and south of Stalingrad. Their points met three days later at
Kalach on the Don River, encircling the Sixth Army, about half of the Fourth
Panzer Army, and a number of Romanian units. Hitler ordered the Sixth Army
commander, General Friedrich Paulus, to hold the pocket, promised him air
supply, and sent Manstein, by then a field marshal, to organize a relief. The
airlift failed to provide the 300 tons of supplies that Paulus needed each day,
and Manstein’s relief operation was halted 34 miles short of the pocket in late
December. The Sixth Army was doomed if it did not attempt a breakout, which
Hitler refused to permit.(Carley 141)
The Russians pushed in on the pocket from three sides in January 1943, and
Paulus surrendered on January 31. The battle cost Germany about 200,000 troops.

In the aftermath of Stalingrad, in part owing to the collapse of the Italian and
Hungarian armies, the Germans were forced to retreat from the Caucasus and back
approximately to the line from which they had started the 1942 summer
offensive.(Keegan 389)
If the United States had entered early into World War II and joined forces
with Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany, the tragic events that occurred during those
years would most likely be changed in history. Pearl Harbor would not have
occurred because Japan would not have needed to provoke Congress to declare war.

Concentration camps and genocide would have most likely been negotiated out of
the battle plan because the United States would have had power over Hitlers
decisions. Communism in Russia may not have been a problem that lasted until the
1980s if the U.S. had convinced Hitler to become an ally because the Russian
leaders may have felt differently resulting in the division of the world between
the victorious powers of the war. If the United States leaders could have
convinced Hitler not to attack the USSR, than most likely, the Cold War would
not have occurred during the forty years after the war between Russia and the
U.S. The alliance between the leaders of both countries began to dissolve in
1944-1945, when the Russian leader Joseph Stalin, seeking Soviet security, used
the Red Army to control much of Eastern Europe. U.S. President Harry S. Truman
opposed Stalin’s policy and moved to unite Europe under American leadership.

Mistrust grew as both sides broke wartime agreements. These events would not
have taken place if the U.S. were an ally with Germany because The USSR would
have been allied with us as well for saving them from attack.

If only President Roosevelt had been more partial to Hitler than to leaders
of France and Britain, maybe history would be written differently. If Roosevelt
had joined forces with Hitler, the United States could have prevented Hitler
from attacking the USSR, and possibly avoided the attack on Pearl Harbor in
December 1941. This could have led to less world communism and possibly
eliminated chances of a Cold War between the States and the USSR for the forty
years after World War II. U.S. leaders during the war should, have taken the
philosophy, Make friends with the enemy, into consideration.

works cited
Carley, Michael J. The Alliance that never was and the Coming of World War
II. New
York: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1999.

Gerdes, Louise. The 1940s. New York: Greenhaven Press, 2000.

Keegan, John. The Second World War. New York: Penguin Books, 1990.


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